Ars Longa Vita Brevis

One thing I've learned from living and working in the Middle East for much of the past 42 years is that, no matter how bad you think things are, they can always get worse.

 

Many people are asking me lately about Saudi Arabia, and especially where things might be going after the grisly extrajudicial killing of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi.  The contours of the Saudi response to that murder, now officially acknowledged by Riyadh after much prevaricating, will have significant implications for the country's internal stability and external relations. 

 

Much commentary seems to conclude that the decision has been taken that Muhammad bin Salman (MBS) will stay on as Crown Prince, with the rap pinned on underlings.  I don't think that is at all clear yet.  My take, in brief, is that the story is not over yet by a long shot.  

 

This article will examine the ramifications of the issue both for Saudi internal stability and for U.S.-Saudi relations.  It will look first at the background to events.  It will review sources of regime legitimacy, the conflicting pressures on King Salman bin Abdulaziz, some of the country's internal security dynamics, and the stakes going forward for Saudi Arabia.  It will then examine the U.S. strategic stake and consider what policy options the U.S. may have.  Finally, it will look at the potential role going forward of Prince Muhammad bin Salman, if he remains in power.  

 

Shura and Ijma'

 

If accountability for the Khashoggi killing is an issue for outside observers, it is an even bigger internal problem in Saudi Arabia.  In 1992 a royal decree promulgated a law on the "Basic System of Governance".  This provides that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab, Islamic state and "its constitution is the Book of God and the sunna (traditions) of his Messenger". 

 

The Kingdom is still at bottom a tribal structure.  Legitimacy inheres from consultation and the emergence of consensus, shura and ijma'.  True, the ruler has great power, but that power rests on consent.  Since the founding of the Kingdom in the early 20^th century by Abdulaziz bin Saud, the primary sources of that consent to rule have been the senior leaders of the wider Al Saud clan and the Al Ash-Shaykh, the pre-eminent family of the religious establishment.  On the death of a ruler, that vital consent is provided to the new ruler by the process of bay'ah, i.e. making a n oath of allegiance.  

 

In recent years, the flattening power of technology has given more voice to both traditional and non-traditional influence centers: the non-royal merchant and professional class, tribes and regions, women and young adults, even major allies, including the United States.  I have always believed, since my first Foreign Service tour in Riyadh 36 years ago, that the education of women will be a key, perhaps the key, driver of change.  But the fact remains that, while different views are increasingly heard, the decision-making apparatus remains pretty much what it has always been.  Indeed, it was the prospect that this might finally change under Muhammad bin Salman that initially led so many outside observers to be captivated by his assertiveness. 

 

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The King's Dilemma

 

The dilemma for King Salman bin Abdulaziz -- figuring out the right path forward in the wake of the grotesque and momentous Khashoggi fiasco -- is a strenuous process and will likely take time to fully unfold.  Notwithstanding his age, Salman is the one ultimately responsible, and accountable.  Long Governor of Riyadh, and an influential, behind-the-scenes mediator of contending Royal Family interests, I recall him as being held in high regard for both his judgement and general rectitude.  But if Salman is not perceived by the leading families and influencers to have acted justly in this case, even though it involves a favorite son, his own reputation and legitimacy could be called into question.  That, in turn, would create instability and uncertainty. 

 

All this comes against the backdrop of a significant pre-existing reservoir of resentment generated by his son, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS), whose perceived high-handedness and failure to consult have pushed the limits of cover extended by his father's prestige and authority.  His widely reported anti-corruption shakedown featured the detention, and alienation, of some of the most wealthy and powerful business people and family members in the Kingdom. 

 

Just as significant, if less well known, his security reforms dismantled what had been a deliberately decentralized system designed to prevent just such a development.  In addition to being Crown Prince, MBS is deputy prime minister, minister of defense, chairman of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, chairman of the Council of Political and Security Affairs, and head of Aramco, the state-run oil and gas company.  Among his significant moves, the new Crown Prince moved the mabaahith domestic security service, with its responsibilities for counterterrorism and counter-intelligence, from the jurisdiction of the Interior Minister to a new Presidency of State Security, reporting to the king (through him). 

 

This stands in stark contrast to what had been the traditional arrangement, in which power centers – especially the various defense and security ministries -- were carefully separated and balanced among the senior princes. 

 

 

Does it Matter?  Can't MBS Just Do What He Wants?

 

Some say this is all mumbo-jumbo.  The security reorganizations of the crown prince render all else moot.  His father is old.  MBS holds all effective reins of power.  He can do pretty much as he likes. 

 

The problem with this argument is that it ignores the founding principles, shura and ijma', on which the Saudi ruling structure (the House of Saud and House of Ash-Shaykh) ultimately rest.  To cast them aside, and rely solely on security forces to rule, would mean not only disrespecting established tradition and precedent, but also that there would be nothing to differentiate the ruler of Saudi Arabia from an authoritarian dictator like Saddam Hussein. 

 

If history, and my own personal impressions over the years, are any guide, most Saudis consider their country, warts and all, a very special place.  It is the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad.  The Qur'an was revealed here.  It has Mecca and Madina, the two holiest cities in Islam.  The Qur'anic injunction to enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong is something of a national motto.  Acting in a way that is inconsistent with, or that would taint, this heritage would generate a negative domestic reaction.

 

 

From Juhayman to Desert Storm and Bin Ladin

 

To understand why that is so, I will recall a little history. 

 

On March 25, 1975, shortly after I began work as a desk editor at UPI's Europe/Middle East/Africa news hub in Brussels, a major story broke:  King Faisal of Saudi Arabia had been assassinated at his majlis by a nephew, Faisal bin Musaa'id.  The nephew evidently nursed a grudge against the king: his brother, Khalid, had been killed by police in 1966 while leading an attack on the new transmitter in Riyadh of Saudi television, an innovation King Faisal had introduced shortly before.

 

After serving 1976-79 as UPI's Beirut bureau manager and chief Middle East correspondent, I went to work on the Washington Post Foreign Desk.  Among the first stories I worked on was urgent news from Saudi Arabia.  On November 20, 1979, a former Saudi National Guard soldier, Juhayman bin Muhammad bin Sayf al-‘Utaybi, led several hundred extremists in what would be a two-week takeover of the Masjid al-Haram in Mecca.  This is the Great Mosque of Mecca, home of the Ka'ba, the most sacred spot in Islam and focal point of the annual Hajj, or pilgrimage.  ‘Utaybi came from the religiously conservative Qasim area of central Najd Province.  He felt the House of Saud had lost legitimacy due to corruption, and by that he meant a corrupt susceptibility to Western influence.  He blamed the Saudi ulama, or religious establishment, for being complicit in this. 

 

 

More License for Religious Conservatives

 

Juhayman and other attackers were tried and executed.  In addition, to bolster its religious credentials, the government mounted a campaign of stricter enforcement of public morals, with special attention to foreigners living in the Kingdom.  This was matched abroad by stepped-up financing of mosque construction and sponsorship of conservative Islamic political groups, charities, and madrasas, through such organizations such as the Jeddah-based Muslim World League.   As part of this general emphasis on religiosity, when Fahd succeeded Khalid as king in June 1982, he reinstated use of the title “Custodian of the Two Holy Sanctuaries (Mecca and Madina)” in place of “His Majesty”. 

 

The domestic morals crackdown was in full swing during my tour as a consular and political officer at the U.S. Liaison Office in Riyadh, 1982-84.  The most conspicuous and public aspect of the government's social retrenchment was the heightened aggressiveness of the mutawwa'un, the so-called “volunteers” of the Committee for Enjoining What is Right and Forbidding What is Wrong, the religious police.  The mutawwa'un were particularly zealous about enforcing Islamic dress codes and store closures at prayer times, and arresting unrelated men and women caught socializing.  Their activities fell under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry.

 

 

The Shock of Desert Storm

 

Another event of importance was Desert Storm, the U.S.-led military operation that drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait after they attacked and occupied it on August 2, 1990. 

 

I was chief of the political section in Kuwait before, during, and after the Iraqi invasion.   Caught outside at the time, I soon found myself in Saudi Arabia as a liaison officer to the Kuwaiti government in exile in Taif.  I spent most of the war there, with excursions to Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dhahran. 

 

For us, Desert Storm was a successful allied military effort that liberated Kuwait and saved Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf from the depredations of Saddam Hussein.  For many Saudis, however, the arrival of large numbers of non-Muslim troops in the homeland of Islam was an even more profound shock than Juhayman's Mecca assault 11 years earlier.

 

The Saudi leadership knew that there would be a negative backlash from religious conservatives.  Usama bin Ladin was among them.  He publicly attacked the government's decision to allow U.S. forces into the country, saying the holiest places in Islam should only be defended by Muslims. 

 

The impact has been documented by Stephane Lacroix in his book Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia.  He wrote, “The announcement of the arrival of non-Muslim reinforcements in the Land of the Two Holy Places fostered the rise of a formidable opposition campaign against the royal family, carried out by a diffuse but well-organized movement, the Sahwa (short for al-Sahwah al-Islamiyya, ‘Islamic awaking').”

 

The Iraqis played remorselessly on this tension in their wartime propaganda.  They beamed in Arabic broadcasts from Iraq with names like “The Voice of Makkah al-Mukarrimah” (the Arabic religious epithet used to describe Mecca –i.e., “Mecca the Honored”) and “The Voice of Madina al-Munawwarah” (the analogous epithet for Madina, i.e. “Madina the Enlightened”).  I recall the surreal experience of staying at the home of an embassy colleague in Riyadh, and tuning my radio in to this programming, which came in like a jackhammer in the evening, as Scud missiles and Patriot batteries dueled overhead.  The broadcasts called on Saudi citizens to rise up against the government and the infidels they had allowed on Saudi soil.  Announcers helpfully offered detailed instructions on how to make home-made bombs from materials readily available in local markets.  They exhorted listeners to place the devices at any handy government office.

 

 

The Contagion of the 1990s – “Afghan” Foreign Fighters and Usama bin Ladin

 

Meanwhile, the Soviets had left Afghanistan in 1989.  Events there took a turn for the worse in 1990-1991 as Washington focused on Kuwait, Iraq, and the aftermath of Desert Storm.  The Najibullah government fell in 1992.  Afghanistan collapsed into civil warfare.  Factional fighting produced chaos, ungoverned spaces, spiking drug production and ultimately, with the support of Pakistan, the rise of the Taliban.   

 

Foreign fighters began to filter back to their home countries in the wake of the Soviet departure.  The effects were felt in many places, including Saudi Arabia. 

 

Usama bin Ladin had been a major recruiter of Saudi fighters for Afghanistan and formed al-Qa'ida there in 1988.  Journalist John Cooley wrote in his 1999 book Unholy Wars, “After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 bin Ladin returned for a short period to Saudi Arabia … he continued to support militant Islamists who had begun to target the governments in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, the Philippines, and elsewhere … Saudi security held onto bin Ladin's passport during the 1989-91 period, hoping to prevent or at least discourage his contacts with extremists he had worked with.” 

 

To escape these constraints Bin Ladin moved in 1991 to Sudan.  He and his followers began to work with other Saudi dissidents against the American military presence and the Saudi royal family itself.  He was stripped of Saudi citizenship in 1994.  U.S. pressure on Khartoum forced him to move from Sudan in 1996.  Bin Ladin went back to Afghanistan.  There, he declared war on the United States. 

 

He engineered the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 that killed over 200 people.  His Al-Qa'ida organization mounted the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people and injured over 6,000 more.  Fifteen of the 19 terrorists involved, and Bin Ladin himself, were citizens of Saudi Arabia.

 

 

The Stakes for Saudi Arabia

 

All these things – from Juhayman to Desert Storm to Afghanistan to Usama bin Ladin -- reside, vividly, within the living memory of Saudi Arabia's senior princes.

 

Thanks to technology, the internet and social media, the challenge of modernity is front and center in Saudi Arabia as never before.  It seems Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman convinced his father the king that old ways were no longer adequate and forceful leadership was required to lead the Kingdom into a stable and prosperous future.  But that meant some of the checks and balances of consultation and consensus-building also fell by the wayside.  And now, the repugnant Khashoggi killing has shocked not only the world but also the country. 

 

So there is a stark choice before the House of Saud: 

 

-  What will be its organizing principles going forward?

-  Will it continue on the authoritarian path staked out by MBS, despite what happened with Khashoggi?

-  Or will it recognize that the absence of limits on the crown prince's executive power led to grave error, with consequences for the national interest? 

-  Will some of those old internal checks and balances be reaffirmed?  

-  Or something else? Prince Talal once spoke of a more democratic, accountable system, a constitutional monarchy.  But that would entail fundamental change, unlikely as a short-term option when the House of Saud presumably wants to signal stability and continuity.

 

 

 

Way Forward Hinges on Accountability for Khashoggi

 

We who live outside the Kingdom are focused heavily on our own reaction.  We tend to forget that what counts in terms of real accountability is not what we do, but what the king and the family do or not do.  Whatever the collective decision on overall organization, the first step on the path forward will be internal accountability in the Khashoggi killing. 

 

Even if King Salman were to decide that he was compelled as ruler to mete out direct accountability on his son, he would likely want the course of action chosen to be seen by his people as an authentic Saudi national decision.  To be seen as acting primarily in response to external pressure would convey weakness, humiliation, and a contemptible susceptibility to foreign influence.  That would delegitimize him in the eyes of public opinion.

 

One of the key family voices will be Prince Ahmad bin Abdulaziz, a full brother of the king.  For decades he and his full brother Nayif were Vice Minister and Minister of Interior, respectively.  One can only suppose he would have looked with disfavor on the centralization of security power by MBS, as well as his foreign entanglements in Yemen, Qatar, and elsewhere.  Whatever the case, by the time Khashoggi was killed, Ahmad had absented himself to London, presumably to avoid placing himself in conflict with his other full brother, King Salman. 

 

It is therefore telling that Ahmad has now returned.  His support for whatever action is taken could be decisive.  Given his background, I suspect Ahmad would be inclined to a stern view, but he and other senior princes are likely still hashing this out with the king. 

 

 

King's Gambit

 

Not least among the stakes here, failure to address squarely the central issue of Muhammad bin Salman's apparent culpability will bring into play the role of the king himself.  He is one who has the final word.  Keeping MBS on would be poorly received not just abroad but at home.  It would aggravate existing dissension within the ruling family and society at large. 

 

The King is premier custodian of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, so any issue that affects him negatively also could affect the legitimacy of stewardship over Mecca and Madina.  That, by extension, would diminish the prestige of the Al Ash-Shaykh, leading family of the clerical establishment and partners in power with the Al Saud.

 

Former CIA Director John Brennan served more than once in the Kingdom and knows it well.  He pointed out recently that Salman has a reputation for piety, for probity, and for disciplining senior family members who get out of line.  What is not known is whether, and to what extent, there is any physical incapacity.   Even if there is none, this episode has so blotted the rule of Salman that I would not rule out the possibility, although it would be unprecedented, that the king could abdicate as part of an eventual sorting-out, stepping aside in favor of Ahmad or some other senior prince.  Failing that, it's hard to see how anything except another change of crown prince could clear the air.  

 

If the king keeps MBS in place, the other thing that will stay is the perception that the ship of state has veered off course.

 

I find it hard to imagine that Ahmad bin Abdulaziz, one of the top enforcers of Saudi public morality for so many years, who left the country once before, would remain.  If he leaves, it would spotlight the family rift.  It's anyone's guess how the internal situation would then play out.  One could hope that some of the positive reforms, e.g. on the role of women in society, would not be a casualty.  But one could also wonder if the perceived excesses of MBS would not create an opening for the same conservative forces that spawned Juhayman in 1979 and the sahwa backlash against the ruling family in the 1990s.  This kind of fitna, or discord, is something the family as a collective presumably will want to dispel, not feed. 

 

 

What Is the U.S. Interest?

 

Why should we care about all this? 

 

Times have changed.  We don't need Saudi oil the way we used to.  They are party to large-scale death and destruction in Yemen, a humanitarian disaster.  They helped finance and fuel the brutal civil war in Syria.  They' blockaded Qatar, where we have a major military base.  That conflict has in turn neutered the Gulf Cooperation Council, once a positive regional counterweight to Iran.  The State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights has for decades cited the Saudis for unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary arrest, and restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, and religion.  And now, Khashoggi.

 

But consider: 

 

-  The U.S. is no longer dependent on Saudi Arabia for oil, but many of our close friends and allies are. 

-  It remains the pre-eminent swing producer.  Its production decisions affect world supply and demand, as well as our own energy prices and economy. 

-  We share important defense, business, banking, and investment ties.

-  With its vast resources, and as homeland of Islam, Riyadh wields influence in the politics and diplomacy of the Middle East and Islamic world. 

-  We have substantial exchanges and liaison relations with the Saudi armed forces, and on law enforcement, intelligence, and counterterrorism.

-  They have re-invested much of their income over the years in U.S. Treasury notes.  CNN Business reported October 15 that U.S. Treasury securities held by Saudi Arabia as of July totaled $166.8 billion, making it the 10^th largest foreign holder of U.S. debt.

-  When we need help with a “tin cup” burdensharing campaign to fund  international initiatives – whether the Gulf War or Afghanistan or Lebanon or Middle East peace -- Saudi Arabia is always one of our first stops.

 

 

Maintain Effective Relations, But…

 

For these reasons, and more, I doubt there is any serious argument within the U.S. government about maintaining close and effective relations.

 

That doesn't mean there aren't things that need fixing.

 

Much has gone wrong lately, mainly in the way of failure to consult when U.S. equities are engaged.  As far as I am aware, Saudi Arabia (and the UAE) did not check with us before launching the blockade of Qatar – although we have important military facilities there.  Nor, so far as I know, did they pre-clear with us a course of military intervention in Yemen that requires U.S.-supplied equipment and spare parts. This would have been unthinkable in the past.  On the other side of the coin, Riyadh would argue we did not adequately factor in their equities with regard to the Iran deal.

 

So it's good news we will have soon a capable ambassador in place with John Abi Zaid.  We need to get back to regular high-level consultations on regional issues.  It's past time to end the Yemen war and the blockade of Qatar, and to restore the GCC to normality.  We will disagree from time to time.  But the channels of communication need to be clear and working.  No more surprises. 

 

 

What About MBS?

 

That still leaves the question of MBS.

 

Secretary of State Pompeo said we seek to preserve the relationship but will also “hold all of those responsible” for the murder accountable.  Pressed by reporters, he has said only he has seen no “direct evidence” linking MBS to the killing.  Until the king speaks, it is the right approach: signaling intent to preserve an important relationship while laying down a marker on the need to determine full responsibility.  

 

President Trump, meanwhile, has stressed the need to maintain relations but skirted the issue of accountability.  Importantly, he hasn't taken direct issue with it though, so the card is still on the table.  It would actually be less helpful, in terms of pursuing real accountability, for the President to publicly press the point.  If he did, it would create pressure on the king, who may still be engaged in closed-door family sessions on this, to take a decision in a way that shows he is not just reacting to foreign pressure. 

 

So we should wait, and calibrate our policy response when we see what the king ultimately does or does not do. 

 

My own hope would be that the king and House of Saud will ultimately assign full accountability and make changes, with the result that MBS is not our primary interlocutor.  However, if this happens, it will not be because we pressed but because they concluded it was the best course for Saudi interests and the legitimacy of their system in the minds of their people.

 

If, on the other hand, MBS stays on, is he coachable?  Would he listen?  I don't know.  We will not stop our dealings with Saudi Arabia.  So we will need to structure a working relationship, based on the situation that evolves, that serves our interests.  At a minimum the ambassador will need to be in close regular contact with the leadership, whether or not that includes MBS.  No need to be bosom buddies but we do need clear channels.  This is usually easier to do discreetly in the field than under the klieg lights of Washington.  It would also help to have a credible Saudi ambassador in Washington. 

 

 

The Biggest Issue

 

The biggest issue in this process is not oil, or military sales, or business deals, or even the atrocious murder of Khashoggi.  The biggest issue is avoiding destabilizing chaos in the birthplace and heart of Islam.  Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu recently made this point, and he is right. 

 

It is true that many in Saudi Arabia, especially women, young people, and educated professionals, yearn for more reform and openness.  But it is also true that there are powerful, conservative forces who oppose this.  The special character of the country as the home of Islam's most sacred shrines is a source of pride for most Saudis, pro-reform or not.  That will not change.  Whether it is Muhammad bin Salman or someone else who is calling the shots, getting the ruling balance right will always be sensitive and difficult.

 

ISIS tried to bolster its legitimacy by using the nomenclature, and even the epigraphy of early Islam.  The lettering on the black-and-white ISIS flag mimics the Kufic script found on early Islamic coins.  If they could wreak so much havoc in Syria, Iraq and abroad from Raqqa, think what such a group could do from Mecca, with command of Saudi Arabia's enormous resources. 

 

However often we have disagreed with the Saudis, we have also worked constructively with them for over 80 years.  This has served regional security and stability.

 

Remember Juhayman, the sahwah, Usama bin Ladin, Al-Qa'ida, and ISIS.  Remember that, for them, Mecca is the ultimate prize.  And remember that, in the Middle East, no matter how bad you think things are, they can always get worse.